~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

23 February 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 31 December 2010 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

George Ellard

GEORGE ELLARD
Inspector General

Matthew G. Olsen

MATTHEW G. OLSEN
General Counsel

(U//~~FOUO~~) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

Keith B. Alexander

KEITH B. ALEXANDER
General, U. S. Army
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
Quarterly Report

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Approved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

I. (U) Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence-Related Activities that Violated Law, Regulation, or Policy and Were Substantiated during the Quarter, as well as Actions Taken as a Result of the Violations

A. (U) Intelligence Activities Conducted under Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 Authority

(U) Unintentional Collection against United States Persons (USPs) or Foreign Persons in the United States

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the fourth quarter of calendar year 2010 (CY2010), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analysts in [redacted] instances inadvertently targeted or collected communications to, from, or about USPs while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. All intercepts and reports have been deleted or destroyed as required by United States SIGINT Directive (USSID) SP0018.

1. (U) Targeting

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] an NSA analyst discovered that [redacted] e-mail selectors for a valid foreign intelligence target remained tasked while the target was in the United States. The tasking error occurred because of a miscommunication between analysts, each believing that the other had detasked the selectors. The query results were deleted [redacted] and no reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] NSA analysts learned that the selector for a valid foreign intelligence target remained tasked while the target was in the United States. [redacted] Collection against the target's selector was suspended [redacted]

~~(S//SI//TK//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] NSA/CSS erroneously targeted [redacted] All collection was purged [redacted] and no reports were issued.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted], an NSA analyst learned that the selectors for a valid foreign intelligence target remained tasked while the target was in the United States. [redacted] The selectors were detasked [redacted] All collection was deleted [redacted] and no reports were issued.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] an NSA analyst discovered that an intercept believed to be from valid foreign intelligence targets was, in fact, from USPs. This error occurred because [redacted] The [redacted] All collection was deleted [redacted] and no reports were issued.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] an NSA analyst erroneously tasked an e-mail selector for a valid foreign intelligence target while the target was in the United States. The analyst discovered the error [redacted] and detasked the e-mail selector. No reports were issued.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] a SIGINT analyst learned that a USP was inadvertently targeted. The [redacted] e-mail selectors, [redacted] were detasked on [redacted] The collection has aged off the collection system, and no reports were issued.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA analysts learned that a USP was inadvertently targeted. [redacted] telephone selectors associated with the target were detasked, and the collection was marked [redacted] All collection had been deleted as of [redacted] and no reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] an NSA analyst discovered that collection on a valid foreign intelligence target had occurred while the target was in the United States from [redacted] Traffic collected during the target's stay in the United States has been [redacted] and will be purged. No reports were issued on the basis of the collection.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] an NSA analyst discovered that [redacted] telephone selectors for a valid foreign intelligence target remained tasked while the target was in the United States. The analyst had suspended collection against the target's selectors [redacted] A second NSA analyst erroneously put the target's selectors back [redacted] This was discovered immediately by the first analyst who again attempted to suspend the selectors [redacted] it was discovered that one of the target's selectors had remained on tasking, and the selector was again suspended. No collection was found for either selector during the time the target was in the United States, and no reports were issued.

2. (U) Database Queries

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ On [redacted] occasions, analysts performed overly broad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially targeted USPs. For example, these queries used [redacted] which produced imprecise results. On [redacted] of those occasions, the queries returned results from the database. The query results were deleted, and no reports were issued. Procedural errors contributed to the following incidents.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On [ ] occasions between [ ] NSA analysts discovered that [ ] on valid foreign intelligence targets while the targets were in the United States. All queries and query results were deleted upon recognition of the travel. No reports were issued on the basis of the results of the queries. The item from [ ] was inadvertently omitted from the 2010 third quarter report.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] NSA analysts queried raw traffic databases using selectors associated with USPs or U.S. entities. On each occasion, the analysts neglected to perform the required research on the selectors before performing the queries. All query results were deleted, and no reports were issued. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] an NSA analyst inadvertently included a [ ] in a query against a raw traffic database. The database auditor discovered the error during a routine audit [ ] and notified the analyst. The query produced no results.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] an NSA analyst performed against the e-mail selector of a valid foreign intelligence target a database query that included dates when the target was in the United States. Upon realization of the error, the analyst immediately deleted the query results. No reports were issued.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] a SIGINT analyst inadvertently performed a database query using the e-mail selector of a USP. All query results were deleted [ ] [ ] and no reports were issued. (b)(3)-P.L. 86

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [ ] an NSA analyst queried a raw traffic database for information about a valid foreign intelligence target after the target was noted [ ] The target's selector was detasked [ ] All non-compliant FAA §702 collection between [ ] [ ] was marked for purging.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] it was discovered that an NSA analyst [ ] [ ] The target was initially thought to be a valid foreign intelligence target but was determined to be a USP [ ] [ ] Although the target's selectors were detasked [ ] a [ ] All query results were deleted [ ] and no reports were issued.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] a SIGINT analyst queried a raw traffic database using a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target [ ] [ ] After submitting the query, the analyst remembered that the target had been in the United States during the range of dates submitted in the query. All results were deleted [ ] and no reports were issued. (b)(3)-P.L. 86

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst erroneously queried a raw traffic database Upon realization of the error, the analyst deleted the query results on without reviewing the content, and the target's telephone and e-mail selectors were detasked the analyst determined that the target had entered the United States and marked all collection between for deletion. No reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- (U//~~FOUO~~) an NSA analyst erroneously queried Upon discovery by the auditor the analyst was instructed to delete the query results and deletion was confirmed No reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ an NSA analyst queried a raw traffic database using selectors associated with valid foreign intelligence targets The analyst misunderstood the procedures for querying raw traffic databases using selectors associated with the targets after their arrival in the United States. The queries and query results were deleted, and no reports were issued.

3. (U) Detasking Delays

(U//~~FOUO~~) the telephone selector for a valid foreign intelligence target was marked for detasking when a SIGINT analyst discovered that the selector was being used by a USP. However, as of the selector had not been detasked from

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

4. (U) Tasking Errors

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ it was discovered that a U.S. telephone number Collection was terminated

B. (U) Dissemination of U.S. Identities

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ The NSA Enterprise issued SIGINT product reports during the fourth quarter of CY2010. In those reports, SIGINT analysts disseminated communications to, from, or about USPs or entities on occasions while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. In SIGINT products, such disseminations were found to be improper, and the reports were canceled as NSA/CSS analysts learned of USPs, U.S. organizations, or U.S. entities named without authorization. All data in the canceled reports was deleted as required, and the reports were not reissued or were reissued with proper minimization.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

C. (U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

1. (U) NSA/CSS Title I FISA

a. (U) Tasking Error

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) an NSA analyst discovered that a USP was inadvertently targeted. The error occurred because the telephone selector contained a typographical error. the selector was detasked from all collection sites All collection was confirmed as deleted

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst learned that a selector tasked under a FISC Order The selector was immediately detasked. All collection was deleted on and no reports were issued.

b. (U) Detasking Delays

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst discovered that telephone selectors that had previously been authorized for collection under an NSA/CSS FISC Order that expired had not been detasked before the start of the new FISC Order The selectors were submitted for detasking and were confirmed as having been detasked All collection was deleted

2. (U)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

a. (U) Database Queries

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst queried the e-mail selector of a valid foreign intelligence target in a raw traffic database without following prescribed NSA procedures. The analyst was made aware of the procedural error, and the query results were deleted No reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst erroneously queried the e-mail selectors of The query and all query results were deleted and no reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

3. (U) **The FISA Amendments Act (FAA)**

a. (U) Section 702

i. (U) Unauthorized Targeting

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) *Note: As previously reported in the 2010 Second Quarter Report, NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure that FAA collection that is required to be purged from NSA/CSS databases is purged. A All collection that has been marked for purging will be purged.*

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA analysts discovered that selectors for valid foreign intelligence targets had been tasked under the incorrect FAA §702 certification. The selectors were tasked to the correct FAA §702 certification Data collected under the incorrect certifications has been marked for purging.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) an FAA §702 selector was tasked without sufficient information to determine the target's location outside the United States. The selector was detasked All non-compliant collection has been marked for purging.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA/CSS discovered that a USP was inadvertently targeted. The error occurred because NSA analysts did not The e-mail selector associated with the target was detasked All associated FAA §702 collection has been marked for purging.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA/CSS received information that an e-mail selector tasked under FAA §702 and believed to be associated with a valid foreign intelligence target did not, in fact, belong to that target. After research to confirm this, the e-mail selector was detasked on All non-compliant collection was marked for purging.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst discovered that an e-mail selector had been tasked under FAA §702 without sufficient proof that the target was outside the United States. The selector was detasked and collection between has been marked for purging.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

ii. (U) Database Queries

(U//~~FOUO~~) a SIGINT analyst entered an incorrect while performing a database query against FAA §702 data. The analyst had intended to enter a valid but inadvertently entered a as a selector. The query produced no results, and the query was deleted

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) an NSA analyst mistakenly queried FAA §702 data using a selector associated with a USP. No results were returned from the query.

(U//~~FOUO~~) an NSA analyst mistakenly performed a database query against FAA §702 data using the selector of a USP. The analyst had intended to use the selector of a valid foreign intelligence target but copied the incorrect selector into the database query field. The query returned no results.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) a SIGINT analyst conducted a database query against FAA §702 data using the e-mail selector of a valid foreign intelligence target and a date range that included dates when the target was in the United States. All query results were confirmed as deleted and no reports were issued.

iii. (U) Detasking Delays

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ NSA analysts discovered that a valid foreign intelligence target had The associated selector was not detasked because the analyst who normally reviewed the collection was on assignment to another organization. the target had departed the United States, all non-compliant FAA §702 data collected between has been marked for purging. No reports were issued.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst learned that a valid foreign intelligence target tasked under FAA §702 had Upon researching the incident, the analyst discovered that an analyst in another division Consequently, the e-mail selector was not detasked until No reports were issued, and data collected between has been marked for purging.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA/CSS learned that a target tasked under FAA §702 was a USP. Research of this matter revealed that an NSA analyst had determined during a routine review of collection that the target was a USP but had not detasked the selector. The selector was detasked and data was marked for purging.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ An NSA analyst noticed that a valid foreign intelligence target After researching the matter, the analyst discovered that the target's selector was not detasked which resulted in the incident. selector was detasked No collection was found during the time when the target in the United States.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ an NSA analyst learned that a valid foreign intelligence target had traveled to the United States Although the analyst

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

detasked the associated e-mail selectors [redacted] No collection or reporting occurred.

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

iv. (U) **Data Handling Errors**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] NSA analysts unintentionally forwarded unminimized U.S. [redacted] in FAA §702 traffic to [redacted] The traffic was purged from [redacted] and the properly minimized traffic was re-forwarded the same day.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

b. (U) **Section 704**

i. (U) **Detasking Delay**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] an NSA analyst learned that the telephone selector associated with a valid FAA §704 target [redacted] the United States beginning [redacted] The analyst [redacted] had detasked [redacted] telephone selectors [redacted] Non-compliant collection from the period between [redacted] was deleted on [redacted] and no reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

c. (U) **Section 705b**

i. (U) **Database Queries**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] NSA analysts performed database queries on valid FAA §705b selectors in raw traffic databases that contain FAA §702 data. Upon realizing the errors, the analysts deleted the queries and results. There was no reporting from these incidents.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

ii. (U) **Data Handling Errors**

~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] a SIGINT analyst mistakenly posted FAA §705b data [redacted] that is not authorized for FISA data. The SIGINT analyst notified his overseers of his mistake.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Also [redacted] a SIGINT analyst discovered that an analyst who was not cleared for FISA had [redacted] FISA §705b data because [redacted] The analyst deleted the data [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

iii. (U) **Detasking Delay**

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] NSA analysts discovered that the selectors for an FAA §705b-authorized target remained tasked after the target returned to the United States on [redacted] An NSA analyst had deleted the telephone selectors for the target [redacted]

[redacted] and the inadvertent collection between [redacted] [redacted] were deleted [redacted] and no reports were issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

D. (U) Other

1. (U) Unauthorized Access

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] it was discovered that a database developer who was not authorized access to FISA data was exposed to files containing FISA data [redacted] All files [redacted] were deleted from the development server [redacted] The developer has [redacted] to ensure that files used do not contain FISA data.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] two database tools were found to contain FISA-derived data. Access to the database tools was not restricted, and analysts who were not authorized to access FISA data potentially had access to the data. All user accounts have since been validated, and access to the databases was removed for analysts who do not have authorization.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] an NSA staff officer inadvertently sent a print job request containing FISA-derived information to a printer in the officer's former office, a location not authorized for FISA access. The printed document was destroyed by the staff security officer at the receiving end [redacted] and the three persons who had viewed the misrouted document signed non-disclosure agreements.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] an NSA analyst e-mailed computer screen shots that included [redacted]-derived data to a contract facility's Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) that is not authorized for [redacted] data. Upon discovery of the error, the staff security officer at the contractor facility was instructed to delete the files and confirm that no data remained on computers or storage devices at the contractor facility.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] an NSA staff officer e-mailed FISA-derived information to an e-mail alias that contained a number of NSA/CSS personnel not cleared for FISA access. Upon discovery of the error, the e-mail was recalled [redacted], and all recipients were instructed to delete the e-mail.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

2. (U) Data Handling Errors

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] an NSA analyst discovered that FAA §702 data was contained in a file directory that could be accessed by personnel not authorized for FAA data. The data was moved from an authorized database to a non-authorized database [redacted] The files were accessible to approximately [redacted] branch members and database developers from [redacted] An update was installed to prevent FAA §702 data from being moved from the authorized database.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] NSA/CSS discovered that [redacted]

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

[redacted] The error was discovered during an update to the [redacted] The computer code has been updated to avoid future errors.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA analysts discovered that FAA §702 data collected [redacted] was held in branch computer files that were accessible to analysts not authorized for FAA data. In addition, the data files were not properly marked to show that they contain FAA §702 data. Upon discovery, the file permissions were changed to allow access only to analysts who are authorized for access to FAA data.

3. (U) Unauthorized Data Retention

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] NSA/CSS discovered that two database tools retained NSA/CSS Title I FISA data beyond the one-year retention period without authorization.

[redacted]

4. (U) Consensual Collection

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] an NSA analyst discovered that a consensual agreement authorizing the targeting of a USP from [redacted] had expired the previous day and that the associated selector had remained on tasking. Upon discovery [redacted] the analyst detasked the selector. Collection was marked for purging from the collection systems, and no reports were issued.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted], NSA analysts discovered that consensual agreements authorizing the targeting of USPs had expired the previous day and that the associated selectors had remained on tasking. Upon discovery, the analysts detasked the selectors. No collection or reporting occurred during the violation period.

5. (U) Unauthorized Collection of Communications Security Monitoring Data

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA analysts discovered that a change to a customer's list of authorized [redacted] was not implemented on a back-up collection platform. Unauthorized data was inadvertently retrieved from the back-up platform from [redacted] when the error was discovered. No reports were issued.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA analysts discovered that collection on [redacted] was conducted beyond the authorized technical data provided by the customer. The collection has aged off the collection system, and no reports were issued.

6. (U) Computer Network Exploitation

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

[redacted]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

E. (U) Counterintelligence Activities

(U) Nothing to report.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

F. (U) Intelligence-Related Activities

~~(S//SI//NF)~~ To reduce the risk of unauthorized telephony collection and prevent violations, NSA/CSS instituted a process that gives analysts greater and faster insight into a target's location. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

When collection occurred, data was purged from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories when required.

~~(S//SI//NF)~~ (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

NSA analysts found e-mail selectors this quarter. When collection occurred, it was purged from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories when required. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//~~FOUO~~) Although not violations of E.O. 12333 and related directives, in instances, database access was not terminated when access was no longer required. Once identified, the accesses were terminated. In addition, there were instances of unauthorized access to raw SIGINT and one instance of account sharing during the quarter.

~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

II. (U) NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Intelligence Oversight (IO) Inspections, Investigations, and Special Studies

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the fourth quarter of CY2010, the OIG reviewed various intelligence activities of NSA/CSS to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance with statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and Department of Defense (DoD) and internal directives. With few exceptions, the problems uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.

A. (U) NSA/CSS Representative

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

B. (U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGINT System

(U) Nothing to report.

C. (U) **Congressional and Intelligence Oversight Board Notifications**

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence committees that NSA/CSS and [redacted] have entered into an arrangement to integrate [redacted] personnel in NSA/CSS spaces [redacted] A copy of the notification is enclosed.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

D. (U) **Other Notifications**

~~(S//NF)~~ NSA/CSS has notified the Attorney General of [redacted] consensual and nonconsensual intelligence-related collection activities for USP hostage cases.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

III. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS IO Program

(U) Nothing to report.

IV. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Changes

(U) Nothing to report.

V. (U) Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect USP (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to IO Programs

(U) Nothing to report.

(U) Intelligence Oversight Quarterly Report

Fourth Quarter, Calendar Year 2010

(U) ACRONYMS AND ORGANIZATIONS

(U) AOR	Area of Responsibility
(U) CNE	Computer Network Exploitation
(U) CY	Calendar Year
(U) DoD	Department of Defense
(U) E.O.	Executive Order
(U) FAA	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act
(U) FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U) FISA	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(U) FISC	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(U) GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
(U) IC	Intelligence Community
(U) IO	Intelligence Oversight
(U) IP	Internet Protocol
(U) NSA/CSS	National Security Agency/Central Security Service
(U) [redacted]	[redacted]
(U) OIG	Office of the Inspector General
(U) SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(U) SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
(U) [redacted]	[redacted]
(U) USP	U.S. person

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